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Jacob Katz Cogan
Wishing to see the trajectory of American history as progressive and
democratic,' historians have ignored the complexities of suffrage expansion
in the nineteenth century-especially the interrelation of exclusion and
inclusion. 2 This Note looks at the trajectory of suffrage reform from the late
eighteenth century to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and argues that
reformers were obsessed with the inner qualities of persons. Whereas the
eighteenth century had located a person's capacity for political participation
externally (in material things, such as property), ' the nineteenth century found
these qualities internally (in innate and heritable traits, such as intelligence).'
1. See, e.g., CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFIRAGt. FROM PROPERTY To DM CRACY. 1760-
1860 (1960) (offering a narrative of suffrage reform with a progressive bias)
2. Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in tie Early American Republic. 41 STAN L RhV
335, 337 (1989) ("If we adopted [a] whig history of suffrage . we would be radically simpllying a
vastly more complex process, and would be engaging in the worst kind of ahistoncal thinking "' There
is no intellectual history of American suffrage General histones include MARCHETTE CHUTm. Ti.at FIRST
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To VOTE IN AMERICA. 1619-1850 (1969). KIRK HAROLD PORTR, A
HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); and WILLiAmSON. 3upra note I Spcial.zed studies
are divided by period and topic, and will be referred to infra. For short. introductory es.says on the history
of voting, see VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Donald W Rogers ed. 1992)
3. Kenneth Greenberg has used the word -superficial" to describe the penchant of antebellum
southerners to be "concerned, to a degree we would consider unusual, with the surface o things-with the
world of appearances." Kenneth S. Greenberg, The None. th i.c and tie Duel in the Antebellun South.
95 AM. HisT. REV. 57, 58 (1990). These same persons would be the staunchest delcnders of property
qualifications, discussed infra in Section I.B
4. Qualifications for office holding and jury service followed this same path. though the latter olten
lagged. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G Deiss. A Brief Iha tor of the Crininal Jur in the Uited
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867. 876-901 (1994). Intellectual histories of the scientific basis o1 intelligence
include CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE TH: DECLINI. AND RI.VIVAL O- DAR%% L tIs
IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991); and John Samuel Carson. Talents. Intelligence, and the
Constructions of Human Difference in France and America. 1750-1920 (19941 tunpublished PhD
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Princeton Universit% Librar) See a/30 WARREN
SUSMAN, "'Personality" and the Making of Titentieth.Centurn Culture. in CULTVLRE AS HISTORY 271. 272
(1984) ("Impulses that control human behavior and destiny were felt to arise more and more snrrhwi the
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Both enfranchisement and disenfranchisement reflected this change of
perspective, this look within. 5
To chart the transformation, this Note examines the debates over suffrage
in the state constitutional conventions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, as well as contemporaneous commentaries. Between 1787 and 1861
every state in the Union convened a constitutional convention in order to create
a new constitution or revise an old one.6 This intense period of constitutional
change seldom gets the attention it deserves, partly because the Federal
Constitution casts such a long shadow and partly because the scattered state
conventions lack the same presence across time and space. Even so, it was
inside and outside these conventions that the constitutional texts of the
eighteenth century underwent revision; their assumptions questioned,
abandoned, and replaced; the very meaning of American democracy defined.
Many of these conventions allowed stenographers to listen, transcribe, and
publish their debates, permitting their constituents and delegates in future
conventions in other states to listen in and call upon the words of those who
went before them. These words were repeated in pamphlets and newspaper and
magazine articles, in effect creating a national conversation that spanned
decades. It is over the course of this long conversation that we can detect the
perspectival change discussed here.7
This Note is more interested in describing a change in the normative
perspective of nineteenth-century constitutional thought than in explaining the
"instrumental" motives of the individual actors whom it highlights.8 Such
motives are important, but they do not explain why certain outcomes were
individual [as the world became more modem].").
5. This Note does not discuss three important restrictions on the suffrage: residency requirements and
the disenfranchisement of both U.S. military personnel and nonresident students. The Supreme Court has
held that residency requirements that seek to maintain informed voting do not further any compelling state
interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972). Similarly, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96-97 (1965), the Court held that the permanent presumption of nonresidence for voting by military
personnel was not reasonable in light of its stated purposes and was therefore unconstitutional. The effect
of duration-of-residence and domicile restrictions on student voters is discussed in, for example, Kenneth
J. Guido, Jr., Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Afternath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 32 (1972); Rakesh C. Lal, What Johnny Didn't Learn in College: The Conflict over
Where Students May Vote, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. Ass'N J. 28 (1992); Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment,
Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident Is Not a Resident, I I FORDHAM URn.
L.J. 489 (1983); Paul R. Rentenbach, Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397 (1971); and Christopher J. Reynolds, Comment, State Residency Requirements for
Purposes of Voting: The Eligibility of Students To Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM. U. L. REV.
774 (1972).
6. See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUs 57, 82 tbl.5
(1982).
7. For introductions to the antebellum state conventions, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 199-246 (1950); and Christian G. Fritz, The Amnerican
Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the
Nineteenth-Century West, 1994 RUTGERS L.J. 945.
8. For a recent review of the uses of intellectual history in legal history, see William W. Fisher Ill,
Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual
History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997). On the method applied in this Note, see id. at 1068.
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desirable (or even possible) at any particular moment, nor do they tell us why
once solid political positions eventually turned to mush. Attention to language
does not deny the instrumental motives of individual actors. Just the opposite.
A speaker's intention to communicate and convince must be presupposed; it
is the intention that allows the historian to take the speaker's words seriously
(which is different from taking them at face value).9 At any moment in
history, actors use and invent certain words and arguments because those
utterances uniquely resonate at that place and time with their intended
audience, resolving the contradictions of the surrounding world in ways other
words and arguments simply cannot.' ° A conclusion that the language of the
look within simply perpetuated old status relations in new skins" would
ignore the significance of the fight itself to the contestants, if not also the
changes (however modest) that resulted.'-
2
Part I will describe the external view that characterized the eighteenth
century, and how its explanatory force gradually faded. Part I1 will describe
the creation of the internal view, how it led to manhood suffrage, and how, at
the same time, it continued to disenfranchise women and blacks. Part II will
offer a brief conclusion, tying in some additional categories of excluded
persons and exploring the limits of the look within.
I. THE EXTERNAL VIEW
A. Imagining the People
The crux of the Constitution's successful unification of a diverse country
was its implementation of the invitingly vague concept of popular sovereignty
on a national scale. 13 The people would rule, and rule actively. But if this
9. See Quentin Skinner, Motive3, Intentton and the Interpretation of Tes.t, In MI-ANLG ANt)
CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND His CRrrTcs 68, 95 (James Tully ctd. 198 i
10. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, CoNwEsTED TRUTHS Ki-YwoiDs iN A.'I RICN POLITIs SINCE
INDEPENDENCE 6 (1987) ("We u,5e words, and we are used by %ordb " I Qui-NTLN SKMNER. THiE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT at xti-xiii (1978) (positing that a person cannot simply
"tailor[] his normative language in order to tit his projects." but that such a person "must lalsol t.iiiogl1
his projects in order to fit he available normative language")
11. A number of historians have recently reached this conclusion about othe, 19th-.entufy legal
reforms. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protect3 The EtolhIng Fonta of Statu.3.
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. l1I1I, 1148 (1997) (asking "to w'hat extent hae these .lhanges
in our practices disestablished historically entrenched systems ol social stratification")
12. As Hendrik Hartog has written, "Relorm may have been for the most parn s)mboi.. Yet. the
symbols had potency." Hendrik Hartog, Lais-ermng. Husbands Right3, and "'the L'nwirttten Lm a itn
Nineteenth-Century America, 84 J. AM. HIST. 67, 95 (1997)
13. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE Till- RIsi. ol- POPULAR Soui-R .IONTl tN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S Woof. THE CREATION o1- THE A.M-RICAN RI-PUBLIc, 1776-
1787, at 344-89 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaing of Repubhtran Gusernment Popular
Sovereignty Majority Rule, atnd the Denoinator Problem. 65 U CoLo L Ri- 749. 749-52 11994,
Christian G. Fritz, Alternatie Vbion of American Con.ttutonaltan Popular So% eel gnti and the Eatrls
American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST L Q 287 (1997). John M Murnn. A Roof Without
Walls: The Dilenmna of American National Identin. In BEYoND CON -I)ERATION ORIGINS o0- TIE
19971
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 473
process of accepting the concept of "the people" was complete, 14 the more
dangerous course of imagining who constituted "the people" had barely begun.
That was left to the states. In the name of conciliation and practicality, the
federal constitutional convention recognized that "[t]he right of suffrage was
a tender point.... The States are the best Judges of the circumstances &
temper of their own people."'15 Pierce Butler of South Carolina noted that
"[t]here is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of
suffrage."' 6 James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, concurred: "To have
reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule
would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would
have been difficult to the convention."' 7 So the delineation of the nuts and
bolts of political participation-suffrage, representation, apportionment, and
citizenship itself-devolved almost entirely upon state legislatures or, more
often, upon constitutional conventions.'8 Inside and outside these forums, the
idealized fiction of popular sovereignty met its uncertain reality. There, the
uncomfortable question was asked again and again: Who are the people?
B. Property and Suffrage
When the Federal Constitution was ratified in 1788, nearly every state
required some form of property ownership to qualify for the vote. 9 Most
often this requirement rested on ownership of a freehold estate.2" The
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
14. That is, the acceptance of popular political behavior became accepted as normative. On the process
of accepting the concept of "the people," see RICHARD BUEL, JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789-1815 (1972).
15. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 201 (Max Farrand ed., rev. cd. 1937)
(statement of Oliver Ellsworth).
16. Id. at 202 (statement of Pierce Butler).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter Cd., 1961).
18. Article I, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution was one of the few exceptions to this general
pattern of delegation. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (providing suffrage and apportionment requirements for
congressional elections). Congress also received the power of naturalization. See id. § 8. See generally
JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 (1978) (examining the
sources of American citizenship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (tracing the illiberal character of American citizenship laws up to the early 20th
century).
19. For a detailed list of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the suffrage, see WILLI PAUL
ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 293-307 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., University
of N.C. Press 1980) (1973). Histories of the suffrage in colonial and revolutionary America include:
CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 46-98 (Studies in History,
Econ. & Pub. Law Vol. III, No. 1, New York, Columbia College 1893); ROBERT J. DINKN, VOTING IN
PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1688o1776, at 28-49 (1977);
ROBERT J. DNKN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL
THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982); and ALBERT EDWARD McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE
FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
20. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 5. See generally DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC:
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 67-69 (1980) (situating property within the ideology of
classical republicanism); Chester E. Eisinger, The Freehold Concept in Eighteenth-Century American
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advantage of a freehold was twofold. First, a freehold demonstrated a
permanent interest in the community. Second, a freehold proved a person's
disinterestedness and independence. As Blackstone wrote, "The true reason of
requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude
such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no
will of their own."'" John Adams agreed, noting that "[s]uch is the Frailty of
the human Heart, that very few Men, who have no Property, have any
judgment of their own."22 Some states also allowed a certain net worth to
serve as an alternative qualification to a landed interest.23 Either way, the
requirements sought to insure virtue amongst the electorate and its
representatives. To this end, some colonies supplemented the freehold with
religious qualifications. 4 Others excluded persons on the basis of sex' and
race.' But these last two restrictions were articulated less frequently, if only
because (as a consequence of coverture or slavery) they were so often
subsumed within the freehold qualification itself.
By the early nineteenth century, with a new market society taking
shape,27 property was not the stable force it once had been. Now prized for
its malleability and productivity, property no longer connoted the qualities that
had made it synonymous with virtue and independence.2 The assault on the
freehold qualification, the paragon of trust for the old order, would not be far
behind.
Propped up by supports that were no longer stable, the justification for
freehold qualifications would gradually collapse.29 Every state admitted to the
Union after the ratification of the Constitution, save one,' rebuffed a property
Letters, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 42 (1947) (descnbing the "Jeffersonian Myth" and its emphasts on the moral
value of land ownership).
21. 1 WtLUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *170
22. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26. 1776). in 4 PAPERS of- JOHN ADAMS 208.
210 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979); cf WOOD, supra note 13, at 168-69 (setting out the class bias of even
some of the more radical Revolutionaries).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776. art. V; MASS, CONST pt 2. ch. I. § 3. art IV (1780) (amended
1821); NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777. art VII (applying only to assemblymen)
24. Catholics were disenfranchised in Maryland and New York dunng the colonial penod, non-
Christians (specifically Jews) were disenfranchised in Maryland. New York. Rhode Island. and South
Carolina. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 15-16. After the Revolution. only the South Carolina
constitution retained a clause that required voters to recognize the existence of God See S C CONST of
1778, art. XIII.
25. New Jersey was the lone exception to the exclusion of women from the suffrage See Judith Apter
Klinghoffer & Lois Elkis, "The Petticoat Electors": Women's Suffrage in New Jersei, 1776.1807. 12 1
EARLY REPUBLIC 159 (1992).
26. Free blacks were disenfranchised in Georgia. South Carolina. and Virginia See WILLIAMSON.
supra note 1, at 15.
27. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 311-18 (1992)
28. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw. 1780-1860. at 31-62
(1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINhT.F sH-CNrTuRY
UNITED STATES 25 (1956).
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. In its 1796 constitution, Tennessee adopted a nominal freehold requirement The freehold could
be of any size. See TENN. CONST. of 1796. art. Ill, § I
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requirement; and of the original thirteen states, Maryland, New Jersey, and
South Carolina eliminated their restrictions in the years between the ratification
of the Constitution and the War of 1812.31 But the landowners and wealthy
merchants who retained political power, particularly the plantation owners of
eastern North Carolina and Virginia, and the rural landowners of Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island, did not go gently. 31 While a
number of states would retain property requirements for white men after
1830, 33 the conventions of the 1810s, 1820s, and 1830s marked the
culmination of the attack on property that had begun in the eighteenth century.
Confronted with this challenge, property defenders held onto their power
ever more tightly and devised new theories of government to legitimate old
political structures. They did so by refashioning the very logic of corruption
and self-interest that had undermined their rule into a new political theory of
interests. 34 Property defenders contended that there were two interests in
society, personal rights and property rights, each "indispensable to every
movement of Government. '35 Property represented a "peculiar interest" and
therefore required an "authority proportioned to that interest and adequate to
its protection. '36 This goal could be accomplished in several ways: by a
freehold suffrage requirement to vote for representatives to either or both
houses of the legislature, by a freehold requirement for office holding, or by
the inclusion of property in the formula of legislative apportionment (in a
31. See MD. CONST. of 1776, amends. 12 & 14 (1810); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (1810); Act
of Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875).
32. These states held constitutional conventions as follows: Connecticut in 1818; Massachusetts in
1820-1821; New York in 1821; North Carolina in 1835; Rhode Island in 1824; and Virginia in 1829-1830.
See Sturm, supra note 6, at 82 tbl.5.
33. North Carolina dropped its freehold requirement for voting for governor in 1835, but retained one
for the election of senators until 1857. See N.C. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3 (1857) (senators); id. art. II,
§ I (governor); Thomas E. Jeffrey, "Free Suffrage" Revisited: Party Politics and Constitutional Reform
in Antebellum North Carolina, 59 N.C. HIST. REV. 24, 25 n.3 (1982). Rhode Island stubbornly kept its
restrictions until the onset of civil strife in the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. See R.I. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2
(1842) (amended 1888) (providing an alternative to the property qualification). See generally PATRICK T.
CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841 (1977);
GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976); MARVIN E. GETLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION (1973).
Tennessee dropped its freehold requirement in 1834. See TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. IV, § 1. Virginia
eliminated its freehold requirement in 1851. Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (elaborating the
freehold qualifications), with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § I (eliminating the freehold requirement). See
generally WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION 278 (1996).
34. This section focuses on the constitutional conventions of Connecticut, New York, and Virginia.
On these conventions, see, respectively, RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION, 1775-1818,
at 236-64 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1963) (1918); John Antony Casais, The New York State Constitutional
Convention of 1821 and Its Aftermath (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on
file with the Columbia University Library); SHADE, supra note 33, at 50-77; and ROBERT P. SUTrON,
REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONsTrrUION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 72-102 (1989).
35. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION oF 1829-30, at 71 (Richmond,
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similar fashion to the U.S. Constitution's Three-Fifths Clause," which
defined the apportionment of the House of Representatives).
Advocates of property representation did not impute evil motives or
wickedness to those without property, only envy. "[Als all men know now,"
Richard Morris explained, "unless property is protected, it will be invaded."'5
The principle of government, this theory stressed, should "not [be] confidence,
but jealousy and watchfulness" of persons. 9 Only fools, argued Benjamin
Watkins Leigh, would base a government on "the moral sense of mankind"
when "self-love is the great spring of human actions."' Even "the highest
degree of moral virtue, the most pure and unblemished integrity, and ...
sublime intelligence, afford us no adequate protection: for men always have
differed, and always will differ, in questions involving great and expensive
objects of national enterprize."4 If the power to determine taxation and
appropriations were given to those who did not contribute their own earnings,
"they may ... destroy those from whom it is thus unjustly taken." 2 In short,
because government acted on the interests of persons and property, each of
these interests should be represented in government."
The dangers that motivated the proponents of the interest theory of
government were far from illusory. In the southern states, plantation owners
feared that representation and suffrage devoid of a property requirement would
give control of the legislatures to westerners who, desperate for new markets
for their goods, would raise taxes on eastern plantations in order to fund
massive internal improvement projects.' In the northern states, farmers feared
that manufacturers would manipulate their workers to outvote the agricultural
interests. The "manufacturing population must be mo[r]e ignorant, and more
subject to an arbitrary or corrupt influence" than farmers, Jacob Sutherland of
37. U.S. CONST. an. 1, § 2, amended by U S CONST amend XIV. § 2. cf J-_NII-hR NEtDE..SKY.
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (aslicul.ting the %% ays in
which private property was protected at the Founding)
38. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35. at Il1 (statement of Richard Morrs). see
aLso JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATE-S. CtIos-N To REvtsE
THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston. Boston Daily Advertiser rev ed 1853) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-18211 (statement of Daniel Webster (lilt is entirely just that
property should have its due weight and consideration in political arrangements "
39. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830. supra note 35. at 113 (statement of Richard Morms)
40. Id. at 167 (statement of Benjamin Watkins Leigh)
41. Id. at 114 (statement of Richard Moms).
42. Id. at 158 (statement of Benjamin Watkins Leigh). %ee albo NOAH W-.BSThr,. JR. A.; ORATION.
PRONOUNCED BEFORE THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAVEN. ON THE ANNIVERSARY 01- THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 18 n.* (New Haven, William W Morse 1802) C[Als property is uiequullh and sullrage
equally divided, the principle of equal suffrage becomes the basis ol nequaht of poner "'1
43. See VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830. supra note 35. at 98 (statement ol Philip P Barbour),
id. at 205-16 (statement of Thomas Joynes).
44. See SUTTON, supra note 34, at 128-29; 3ee also, e g , Harold J Counihan. The North Carolina
Constitutional Convention of 1835: A Study in Jackonuan Democracy. 46 N C HtST REV 335. 347-62
(1969).
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New York asserted in 1821. Workers "were liable to sudden, violent, and
dangerous excitements" and, as "all classes of the lower orders of society[] are
more or less subject to influence," they were easily manipulated. 46 Not
knowing better, workers "look with something of deference and respect to the
opinions of those who employ them, who consequently minister to their
comfort or subsistence. 47
But the property-based theory of government was not simply utilitarian;
property, for its advocates, continued to be the best test of character, just as it
had been in the eighteenth century. While it "conferred upon its possessor
neither virtue, integrity, or talents," Ezekiel Bacon declared in New York's
convention, "it could not be disguised that ... it was a safe general rule that
industry and good habits did in almost every instance conduct the man that
practiced them, to some moderate share of property, and to a small
competence, which only he would require."4 If not a foolproof technique, the
property qualification, he said, "furnished the most probable test of character,
and the greatest likelihood of finding united with it independence, sobriety, and
safe intentions."49 Landholders, wrote David Daggett of Connecticut, "have
too much self respect to endure the slightest approaches to slavery-they have
too much at stake to tolerate anarchy., 50 Other defenders of the property
qualification argued that the reverse was true as well: The absence of property,
Warren Dutton of Massachusetts said in 1820, indicated that a person was
either "indolent or vicious."''. "In every commercial society," Henry Ford of
New Jersey argued in 1806, "wealth is the measure of respectability, and the
foundation for that spirit of independence absolutely essential to unbiassed
elections."52
If nothing else, property defenders insisted, the consequences of suffrage
expansion and equal representation were unknown, and therefore expediency
demanded careful and deliberate scrutiny. The suffrage, they said, was entirely
arbitrary; therefore, "[i]f it can be limited any where... it is a question of
expediency at what point it shall be fixed. '53 As there was no telling how
45. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEw-YORK 281 (Albany, E. & E. Hosford
1821) [hereinafter NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 18211 (statement of Jacob Sutherland).
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also MASSACHUSETrS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 251 (statement of
Josiah Quincy) ("[T]he rich [person], by the influence resulting from his property over the class of paupers,
has a power of indemnifying himself a hundred fold.").
48. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 285 (statement of Ezekiel Bacon).
49. Id.
50. DAVID DAGGETT, FACTS ARE STUBBORN THINGS, OR NINE PLAIN QUESTIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF
CONNECTICUT 20 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1803).
51. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 247 (statement of Warren Dutton).
52. HENRY FORD, AN ORATION, DELIVERED IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH AT MORRIS-TOWN, JULY
4, 1806, at 8-9 (Morristown, Henry P. Russell 1806).
53. A Freeman, CONN. COURANT, Sept. 29, 1818, at 2.
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dangerous universal suffrage might be, it was best to err on the side of
safety.54 And so, while the property qualification was "not perfect, [it was]
the best human wisdom can devise. It affords the strongest, if not the only
evidence of the requisite qualifications; more particularly of what are
absolutely essential, 'permanent common interests with, and attachment to, the
community."'55
II. THE LOOK WITHIN
These sentimental visions of agricultural life failed to convince the
disenfranchised and unrepresented. For one, the property holders' purported
fear of the manufacturing interests seemed overstated because the difference
between the landholder and the manufacturer was no longer as clear as it once
might have been. Was not the "powerful manufacturer ... connected with the
landed interest? Is not the manufactory itself real estate?" asked Erastus Root
of New York.56 If so, "[p]roperty [would] always carry with it an influence
sufficient for its own protection." 57 Therefore, there was no danger that
manufacturing, commerce, and labor would combine to destroy agriculture.
Critics claimed the opposite was true, namely that money, in the form of
property, corrupted. And though it was commonly "thought ... that poverty
and vice are identified,"58 critics of the property requirement argued that, to
the contrary, "more integrity and more patriotism are generally found in the
labouring class of the community than in the higher orders.""9 One simply
had to "look to the higher classes of society .... [to] discover the grossest
abuse of wealth." Land title failed to "contribute to the elevation of the
mind, or [to give] stability to independence, or [to add] wisdom to virtue."'
Nor did it give "any evidence of peculiar merit, or superior title," a group of
Virginia non-freeholders asserted.62 In fact, they contended, "were it not for
the gravity with which the proposition is maintained, and still more, for the
grave consequences flowing from it" the ascription "to a landed possession,
[of] moral or intellectual endowments, would truly be regarded as
ludicrous. 63 Land, they said, "no more proves him who has it, wiser or
54. See R., Connecticut Convention, CONN COURANT, Sept 22. 1818. at 3
55. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35. at 27 (Memonal of the Non-Frccholders of
the City of Richmond) (paraphrasing the arguments of their opponents)
56. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 223 (statement of Erastus Root)
57. Id. at 225 (statement of Jacob Radciff).
58. Id. (statement of P.R. Livingston).
59. Id. at 239 (statement of John Cramer).
60. Id. at 225 (statement of P.R. Livingston).
61. Id.
62. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35. at 27 (Memonal of the Non-Frecholders of
the City of Richmond).
63. Id.
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better, than it proves him taller or stronger, than him who has it not."'
Benjamin Austin of Massachusetts wondered why men must wait "till they
have turned their intelligence into stock" in order to get the vote.65 There was
no proof "that the States in wh[ich] a property qualification is established,
either choose wiser men, or are less democratical than those States where the
property qualification for electors does not exist," admitted even property-
defender Rufus King.66 Property, "experience has shewn[,] ... forms not the
scale of worth," P.R. Livingston asserted, "and ... character does not spring
from the ground. 67
This skepticism in the attributes of property led Americans to search
elsewhere for the location of the qualities necessary to vote. So, disillusioned
with the adequacy of external characteristics as indicators of virtue, they
looked inward. Section II.A traces the gradual realization during the first
decades of the nineteenth century that these characteristics were to be found
within all white men. Sections lI.B and II.C show how white men delimited
this discovery by sex (by asserting a distinct familial role for women) and race
(by asserting the uncultivated nature of the minds of black men).
A. Manhood Suffrage
Since property ownership could not be counted upon to guarantee
independence and virtue, that qualification quickly turned into one of many
ways to demonstrate a stake in society. By the 1790s, some Americans had
already begun to explore the limits of this revelation.68 A stake in society,
they noticed, did not have to be immovable; a demonstrable interest or
meaningful contribution could suffice. Any person who gave, in one way or
another, to the administration of the state should earn the vote. "Does not the
adventurous mechanic, who ... turns himself with steady industry to the
pursuits of the occupation in which he has been bred, give sufficient 'evidence
of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community'?" asked
Virginia state senator William Munford in 1801.69 "[Tjhose who bear the
burthens of the state," Nathan Sanford argued in the New York constitutional
64. Id.
65. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 252 (statement of Benjamin
Austin).
66. Letter from Rufus King to Christopher Gore (Dec. 18, 1820), in 6 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 365, 365-66 (Charles R. King ed., 1900).
67. NEw YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 225 (statement of P.R, Livingston); see also
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, supra note 38, at 253 (statement of Joseph Richardson)
("Want of property in a free government, should be the last thing to prevent men from voting, unless the
possession of property were shown to be necessarily connected with virtue.").
68. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 92-95 (1997).
69. A Citizen, To the Citizens of Riclunond, Not Freeholders, VA. ARGUS (Richmond), July 31, 1801,
reprinted in THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 14, 15 (Irving Mark & Eugene L. Schwaab eds., 1952). The
author of this article was William Munford. See THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS, supra, at 14.
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convention of 1821, "should choose those that rule it."7 Thus, he continued,
"Itihere is no privilege given to property, as such; but those who contribute to
the public support. we consider as entitled to a share in the election of
rulers."'7 The rallying cry of the Revolution, "no taxation without
representation," became the mantra of manhood suffrage proponents. 2
But the taxpaying qualification, first instituted in Pennsylvania's
constitution of 177673 and subsequently adopted by a number of states,7"
was not the only way to demonstrate the requisite stake in society. It was
unclear to some why monetary contributions to the state "confer[red] a better
claim to political power than those of any other description."" Why, for
instance, should taxes take priority over "personal services" such as militia
duty?76 "He who devotes the energies of his body and mind to the welfare of
his country, labours to promote her best interests, or defends her rights upon
the battle field, may surely claim the merit of having contributed to the support
of Government," argued one suffrage advocate.77 Samuel Young, in New
York's constitutional convention, pointed out that those who performed militia
service "really paid a heavier tax than many freeholders of S200O.T'h In sum,
"[n]o reason can be assigned, why those who bear the public burthens, either
by defending the soil, or by contributing to the support of government, should
not be entitled to exercise the elective franchise. 79 Similarly, the Niles'
Register concluded that, "As a general principle, then, we hold it to be
equitable, that every citizen who may be called into the military service ...
or who is liable to a [tax] should have the fight [to vote]."' Thus, even those
who worked the public highways deserved the vote.' The logic implied that
"[a]ll are bound to contribute to the support of Government according to their
70. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821. supra note 45. at 178 (statement of Nathan Sanford).
71. Id.
72. E.g., id. at 257 (statement of Martin Van Buren)
73. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6. The taxpaying provisions were retained in Pennsylvania's later
constitutions. See PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I1l. § 1. PA CONST of 1790. an 111. § I
74. See, e.g,, CONN. CONST. of 1818, an. VI, § 2 (giving alternative suffrage requirements of freehold.
tax, or militia service); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV. § I; GA CONST of 1798. an IV. § I. LA Co.s-r
of 1812, art. II, § 8 (establishing taxpaying as an altemative to a property requtrement). MASS CO.;ST
amend. I1 (1821) (amended 1891); MISS. CONST. of 1817. art 111. § I (giving alternative suffrage
requirements of militia service or tax); N.H. CONST of 1784. pt II; N Y CoNsT of 1822. art It. § I
(giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia se ice, tax, or public highway duty); N C Co.NsT of
1776, art. ViII (applying to assemblymen only); OHIO CONST of 1802. art IV. § I. R I Co,;ST art. I1. §
2 (1842) (amended 1888) (giving a taxpaying alternative in legtslative elections to the freehold suffrage
requirement for native-born citizens); S.C. CONST of 1790. an 1. § 4 (giving a taxpaying alternative to the
freehold suffrage requirement). All of these provisions were revoked by 1902
75. VIRGINIA CoNvEN'nON OF 1829-1830. supra note 35, at 101 (statement of Bnscoe G Baldwin)
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45. at 274 (statement of Samuel Young)
79. Franklin, The Cotistitutton, Am. MERCURY (Hanford). Sept 29. 1818. at 3
80. The Right and Power of Suffrage, 19 NILES' REG (Baltimore) 115. 115 (1820) (cmphasts omitted)
81. New York's constitution of 1822 provided for just that See N Y COssT of 1822. art I1. § I
(giving alternative suffrage requirements of militia service, tax. or public highway duty)
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means [and] all are entitled to the right of suffrage who have sufficient
evidence of permanent common interest in, and attachment to, the
community. 8 2 Even the remotest civic contribution conceivably could be
construed as taxation and thus as ample qualification for the suffrage.
Provoked by these realizations, advocates of suffrage expansion developed
by the 1820s a political theory of human nature to counter the property-
oriented, interest group theory of representation. The new theory postulated
that the qualities of independence, virtue, and intelligence--once associated
with property ownership-were in fact found within each and every man.
"Nature has made no distinction among men," argued James Robertson in the
Virginia House of Delegates in 1806.83 "Man is man, and it is not within the
power of a freehold to change his character."'  "We give to property too
much influence," one New Yorker concluded.8 5 "It is not that which mostly
gives independence. Independence consists more in the structure of the mind
and in the qualities of the heart. '8 6 According to the Virginia non-freeholders,
virtue and intelligence were not "the products of the soil" and "[a]ttachment
to property [was] not to be confounded with the sacred flame of patriotism.""
Instead, patriotism was "engrafted in our nature" and "exists in all climates,
among all classes, under every possible form of Government." 8 Riches
impaired patriotism more often than poverty.8 9 Consequently, "the only
effectual guarantee, against the abuse of power in a republic, is to be found,
and to be found only, in the virtue and intelligence of the people, in whom all
power rests."9
As a consensus emerged that men inherently possessed the qualifications
for the vote, property and even taxpaying requirements made less sense. By the
1840s, white manhood suffrage became the norm.9' Nothing should "step in
between [a man] and the exercise of his natural rights as a citizen," John
Simonds of Massachusetts asserted in 1853.92 Simply because "accidents of
birth or property"'93 may have made a man rich or poor did not make him less
qualified to govern. The principle was, as Simonds put it, "that a man is a
82. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 102 (statement of Briscoe G. Baldwin).
83. Call of a Convention, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Feb. 1, 1806, at 3 (statement of James Robertson
in the Virginia House of Delegates debate on the calling of a constitutional convention).
84. Id.
85. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 235 (statement of Daniel D. Tompkins).
86. Id.
87. VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 27 (Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of
the City of Richmond).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 107 (statement of Alfred H. Powell).
91. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 110 tbl.; WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 260-61.
92. 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED
MAY 4TH, 1853, To REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 554 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) [hereinafter MASSACHUSEIrS CONVENTION OF 1853]
(statement of John W. Simonds).
93. Id. at 566 (statement of Benjamin F. Hallett).
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man; [and] that mind and judgment make a man, instead of fortune or any
outward circumstances, of whatever nature."9 In essence, "the sovereignty
of government [was found with]in the man."
9s
B. Woman Suffrage
When suffrage rested in property, few questioned the gendered limitations
of the vote.96 Through the system of coverture, as William Jarvis wrote in
1820, married women simply "confered upon their husbands, by the marriage
contract, all their civil rights: not absolutely .... but on condition, that the
husband will make use of his power to promote their happiness, and the
propriety of their children."97 Because they could not hold property in their
own names and because their legal statuses were subsumed in their husbands',
married women could not qualify for the suffrage. By this logic, however, it
might have seemed that unmarried women or widows deserved elective rights.
But, as Jarvis explained, because "it [was] considered, that no practical
inconvenience has ever been experienced . . . ,and that no possible good could
result from conforming the practice of the country, in this particular, to strict
theory," even these women were not granted the vote."5 That propertied
women lacked the vote, Edward Keyes of Massachusetts stated more than
thirty years later, was "one of those accidents and misfortunes which is
irremediable directly, but which is amply compensated for in a thousand other
ways [and is a small sacrifice to pay] for the good of the rest of the
community."99 Though unmarried propertied women did vote in New Jersey
until they were disenfranchised in 1807," ° men presumed that women really
did not desire the vote. 0'
Some argued, however, that women were competent to vote, regardless of
their desire to do so. Defenders of the property requirement--eager to point
out the inconsistencies in the arguments of manhood suffrage
advocates-asserted that women (if they cared to) were just as capable of
voting as men. "Can any gentleman shew me a reason drawn from nature,"
Philip Barbour of Virginia argued, "which subjects females, as such, and
94. Id. at 554 (statement of John Simonds)
95. Id. at 564 (statement of Benjamin F Hallett)
96. But see KRUMAN, 3upra note 68, at 103-06 (noting a lew persons who questioned the
disenfranchisement of widows and unmarried propcnied women in the 1770s)
97. WILLIAM C. JARVIS, THE REPUBLICAN; OR, A SERIES o- ESSAYS O THE PRINCIP.I-S ANt) POLICY
OF FREE STATES, HAVING A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UNITEI) STAII-S OF AIRICA AND THE
INDIVIDUAL STATES 66 (Pittsfield. Phineas Allen 1820)
98. Id. at 67.
99. 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853. 3upra note 92. at 735 (staitement of Edw.id L Keyes)
100. See Klinghoffer & Elkis, supra note 25. at 159-60.
101. See, e.g., VIRGINIIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, .upra note 35. it 227 (statcment o Samucl M'D
Moore) ("Women have never claimed the right to participate in the formation of the Government ")
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because of their sex only, to the dominion of men? 10 2 An unmarried
woman, over twenty-one, he pointed out, was still "in possession of all her
rights," and "those rights are by nature the same with those of the other
sex."'0 3 Men "merely as such, have no natural right to exercise any control
over her whatsoever."'" It could "not be contended," Barbour concluded,




Capacity, however, would prove to be precisely the point of contention and
exclusion. Advocates of manhood suffrage based their theory on the capacity
of persons, and that capacity, in their view, was distinctly gendered. A
woman's mind, they claimed, was "more fit for the sphere in which [God]
intended her to act, [and so He] had made her weak and timid, in comparison
with man, and had thus placed her under his control, as well as under his
protection."'1 6 Suffrage, John R. Cooke of Virginia argued in 1829, implied
exclusively masculine traits such as "free-agency and intelligence; free-agency,
because it consists in election or choice between different men and different
measures; and intelligence, because on a judicious choice depends the very
safety and existence of the community."" Women, therefore, had a natural
"incapacity to exercise political power."' 8 According to this view, women's
unique-though not necessarily inferior-capacity lay elsewhere: in their own
domestic and familial sphere.0 9
Women contested this characterization from the moment it was made.
Cooke and his fellow Virginians, for example, were countered by "Virginia
Freewoman," who, in a newspaper article published during the convention,
questioned the assertion of women's natural incapacity to participate in
politics."0 In arguments reminiscent of Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication
of the Rights of Woman,"'. "Virginia Freewoman" took aim at the notion of
separate spheres that had already become conventional wisdom: "You
boast ... of your superior intelligence of mind-You say, that you alone can
exercise the right of suffrage, . . . [but] if we enjoyed greater opportunities of
improvement, we too ... could think, and feel and act for ourselves, in matters
102. Id. at 92 (statement of Philip P. Barbour).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see also G.S. Hillard, The Letters of Silas Steadfast, BOSTON COURIER & ATLAS, 1853
(arguing that the right to vote is based on expediency and not on capacity), reprinted in DISCUSSIONS ON
THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS BY THE CONVENTION OF 1853, at 117,
117-20 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
106. VIRGINIA CONVENTION Of 1829-1830, supra note 35, at 55 (statement or John R. Cooke).
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. On the concept of separate spheres, see NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANUOOD:
"WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977). For an example of the rhetoric of separate
spheres, see hfra text accompanying notes 124-130.
110. Virginia Freewoman, The Rights of Wiomen, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Oct. 10, 1829, at 2.
111. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WomAN 223-30 (Miriam Brody
ed., Penguin Books 1992) (1792) (discussing the effects of education on development).
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of government, with as much independence as you do."" By the 1840s, a
number of women, disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of their social reform
agenda," 3 joined "Virginia Freewoman" and began to question the separate
spheres ideology that shut them out of the political arena. Men, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton argued, "fail[ed] in the business they undert[ook]," whether it was "in
the pulpit, at the bar, or in our legislative halls.""' "Now," she continued,
"is it to be wondered at that woman has doubts about the present position
assigned her being the true one, when everyday experience shows us that man
makes such fatal mistakes in regard to himself?"" 5 If men did not fit within
the idealized, ideological confines of their own sphere, why should women?
Not only were the accepted boundaries of men's and women's separate
spheres incompatible with reality, women argued, but also the concept of
spheres itself was flawed. To justify women's suffrage both women and men
asserted the equality of the sexes. In the Massachusetts constitutional
convention of 1853, for example, William Greene used manhood suffrage
arguments in this way to promote the vote for women. "The people," he
argued, "are they upon whom shines that intellectual light which enlightens
every man that cometh into the world.""' 6 Women were just as "capable of
receiving [this] intellectual light, [and so] are rational creatures, human beings,
enjoying all the faculties which belong to human beings.""' 7 Woman, Norton
Townshend of Ohio said in 1851, "shares equally with man in all the rights
that pertain to our common humanity, and .... I say further that she is man's
equal in intelligence and virtue, and is therefore as well qualified as man to
share in the responsibilities of government.....
If women had the same capacities as men, then they simply had to
demonstrate a stake in society in order to qualify for the suffrage as it was
then conceptualized. The married women's property acts were crucial in this
regard." 9 "We already have a property law," Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote
in 1856, "which in its legitimate effects must elevate the femme covert into a
112. Freewoman, supra note I10, at 2
113. On women's gradual recognition of their need and right to enter the pohiti:.Al sphere. se LoRI
D. GINZBERG, WOMEN AND THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE MORALrY. POLITICS. AND CLASS IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 67-132 (1990)
114. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to George G Cooper. Editor..anonal Reformer (Sept 14,
1848) [hereinafter Letter to George G Cooperl. in 2 ELIZABETH CADY STANrTON AS RI-VX-tL'D IN HER
LETTERS, DIARY, AND REMINISCENCES 18, 19 (Theodore Stanton & Hamot Stanton Blatch eds. Arno Press
Inc. 1969) (1922) [hereinafter STANTON PAPERS1 On Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the early woman suffrage
movement, see ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMtNISM AND SUI--RAG- Tfe EIf-RGE.NCE Of- AN L:tEPF,.ND.E'T
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978)
115. Letter to George G. Cooper, supra note 114. in STANTON PAPERS. 3upra note 114. at 19
116. 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, 3upra note 92. at 726 (statement of William Greene)
117. Id.
118. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS Of- THE CONA'NTrON fOR TH- RE.vtiSIoN of- THE
CONSTITUTION OFTHE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51. at 555 (Columbus. S Medarn 1851 (statement of Norton
Townshend).
119. See NORMA BASCH. IN THE EYES Of- THE LA\% WOMEN. MARRIAGE, AN) PROPERTY IN:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 197 (1982)
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living, breathing woman-a wife into a property holder, who can make
contracts, buy and sell.'120 "It needs but little forethought," she continued,
"to perceive that in due time these property holders must be represented in the
government.'' Using the familiar manhood suffrage argument of no
taxation without representation, six women petitioned the 1846 New York
constitutional convention on behalf of woman suffrage. 22 They argued that
the state, "by imposing upon them burdens of taxation, both directly and
indirectly, without admitting them the right of representation, [struck] down the
only safeguards of their individual and personal liberties."'
12 3
Men countered these assertions of women's rights with an intense defense
of the ideology of separate spheres. The marriage contract established a family,
Abijah Marvin argued in the Massachusetts constitutional convention of
1853:124 "In order to secure the rights of these families-these units,
including all the individuals in them, however young, or weak, or
imbecile-each family must be represented; must have a voice and a vote in
those representative bodies where the laws are made."' 5 Why, then, did men
represent the family? Because, Marvin contended,
there is a division of labor ... between labor in the house at home,
and labor out of doors; between influences exercised within the
family, and without the family; between taking care of the family
within the house, and providing for it, and taking care of its interests,
by thought, labor, and other exertions, in the fields, the shop, the
store, and the assembly.
126
The distinction between the sexes was ordained by God and had its origins in
nature. 27 The family "can have but one will; and the man, who, by nature,
is placed at the head of that government, is the only authorized exponent of
that will."' 28 Thus, even if women were not confined by their natures to a
separate sphere, "it would be a violation of the general rule, that the will of the
whole family is represented by the man, who is the head of the family.
Politically speaking, therefore, woman has no right to be directly consulted in
120. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan. 3, 1856), in 2 STANTON PAPERS, supra
note 114, at 63, 63.
121. Id., in 2 STANTON PAPERS, supra note 114, at 63-64.
122. On this petition, see Jacob Katz Cogan & Lori D. Ginzberg, 1846 Petition for Woman's Suffrage,
New York State Constitutional Convention, 22 SIGNS 427 (1997).
123. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 646 (Albany, Evening Atlas 1846) [hereinafter NEW YORK
CONVENTION OF 1846] (Memorial of Six Ladies of Jefferson County, Asking for the Extension or the
Elective Franchise to Women).
124. See 2 MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 747 (statement of Abijah
Marvin).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 748.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 598 (statement of George Boutwell).
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public affairs."' 129 A woman's proper role was as wife and mother, educating
her husband and sons with the virtue required of republican citizens."
The look within had created the possibility that women could demand
political rights. But the concept of separate spheres effectively, if temporarily,
rebutted that claim, asserting that women and men had different capacities: one
public and political, the other private and familial. Women would only get the
vote at the national level when suffragists turned the language of separate
spheres around and argued that a woman's natural qualities made her uniquely
qualified to vote.13
C. Black Suffrage
In 1835, after years of resistance, a convention met to revise North
Carolina's constitution. 3 2 One of the first items of debate was whether the
right to vote should be limited to white men." Many states had such
qualifications already,' 34 but North Carolina, whose constitution dated back
to 1776, did not, and the few free black men who met the general suffrage
criteria voted. 35 Like New York, which had restricted black voting thirteen
years earlier,'36 and Tennessee, which had disenfranchised blacks the year
before, 3 7 North Carolina's move to expand suffrage to all white men led to
articulate arguments for black suffrage that were ultimately, but not inevitably,
129. Id. at 598-99
130. See Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Afeainings of I rtue tn Reolutonan America. 13 SIGNS 37.
38 (1987); Jan Lewis, Motherhood and tie Construction of the Male Ctizetn ti the Unted State. 1750
1850, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELF 143, 155 (George Levine cdl. 1992)
131. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS O- TH WOMAN SUI-RA . MovEo-M'r. 1890-1920.at 42-
74 (1965).
132. See Counihan, supra note 44. Although this section discusses racial classitications onl,) %,nh
regard to blacks, its argument applies equally to the treatment ol Native Amencans and Asian Amenc,ans.
who were often specifically disqualilied as well. See, e g . MINN CONST all VII. § I u 1857) (amended
1960) (enfranchising only "civilized' Indians); OR CONST an II. § 6 (1857) (repealed 1927) (disqualilying
"negro[esi," "chinamlein," and "mullaiolesl" from the vote)
133. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NoRTH CAROLINA. 1790-1860. .t 105-16 1943)
(recounting the discussion of black suffrage in the North Carolina constiutional convention ol 1835)
134. See, e.g., ALA. CONST of 1819, art 111. § 5, CoNN CoNsT ol 118. .uat VI. § 2. DiFL CoNST
of 1831, art. IV, § I; ILL, CONST of 1818, art. II. § 27. IND CONST ol 1816. all VI. § I. KY CmsT ol
1792, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. of 1776, amends 12 & 14 (1810). MICH CoNST ol 1835. au It. § 1.
MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. Ill, § 1: Mo CONST ol 1820. an 111. § 10. S C CoNsir of 17,, an 1. § 4,
VA, CONST. of 1830, an. III, § 14; Act of Nov 16. 1807. 1811 N J Laws (Bloomheld) 33 tamendcd 1875).
J. Stanley Lemons & Michael A. McKenna. Re.Enfranchetnent of Rhode Island Negroes. 30 R 1 HIST
3 (1971) (discussing the Rhode Island qualufication. which was adopted in 1822), see also Mation
Thompson Wright, Negro Suffrage tn New Jerei. 1770.1875, 33 1 NI-Gao HisT 168. 175 11948)
(describing the process of disenfranchisement in New Jersey). cf NY CosST of 1822. an 11. § I
(establishing a property requirement specific to blacks)
135. See FRANKLIN, supra note 133, at 106-08. Counihan. 3upra note 4-3. at 346, Roger Wallice
Shugg, Negro Voting tn the Ante-Beflivm South. 21 J NEGRO HIST 357. 358 t1936
136. See PHYLLIS F FIELD, THE POLITICS O RACE IN NI-' YORK Ti- S'I'GGLI- R BLACK
SUFFRAGE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 29 (1982)
137. See TENN. CONST. ol 1834, art IV. § 1. J W Pation. The Progre3s of &Fnntlpttonl til Tennessee
1796-1860, 17 J. NEGRO HIsT. 67, 72-74 (1932)
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in vain. 138 The debate on black suffrage would continue until the adoption
of the Fifteenth Amendment-in Pennsylvania in 1837-1838,131 in New York
in 1846,140 and from then on in conventions, legislatures, and popular
referenda throughout the country.14' Though only Rhode Island enfranchised
its black citizens during the antebellum period, 42 the look within forced
Americans to rethink the reasons underlying the exclusion of blacks from the
suffrage.
White male suffrage advocates argued that black men had none of the
qualities that entitled them to the franchise.'43 The "minds of the blacks are
not competent to vote," Samuel Young of New York asserted indignantly.'44
They "had not the requisite intelligence [or] integrity," according to Louis
Wilson of North Carolina. 145 Others made similar claims, arguing that blacks
were "a peculiar people, incapable ... of exercising [the] privilege [of voting]
with any sort of discretion, prudence, or independence."' 146 Unlike white men,
John Ross asserted in 1821, black men had "no just conceptions of civil
liberty," nor did they know "how to appreciate it.' ' 147 Consequently, they
were "indifferent to its preservation.' 48 Young argued that blacks were "too
much degraded to estimate the value, or exercise with fidelity and discretion
that important right,"'149 adding that the vote "would be unsafe in their
138. The proposition to limit suffrage to whites passed by only five votes. See PROCEEDINOS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA, CALLED To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE, WHICH ASSEMBLED AT RALEIGH, JUNE 4, 1835, at 80 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales & Son 1836)
]hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835].
139. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at
75-79 (1961).
140. See FIELD, supra note 136, at 43-52.
141. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO
PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY (1967) (detailing the antiblack laws in the
western and midwestern states during the antebellum period); ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL
STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER passin (1993) (telling the
story of the struggle for black suffrage in Iowa); Tom LeRoy McLaughlin, Popular Reactions to the Idea
of Negro Equality in Twelve Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869: A Quantitative Analysis 37-38 tbl.I
(1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State
University Library) (detailing the outcome of 19 state referenda on black suffrage from 1846 to 1869).
Useful surveys of black suffrage during this period include: LITWACK, supra note 139, at 74-93; EMIL
OLBRICH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860 (Negro Univ. Press 1969)
(1912); James Truslow Adams, Disfranchisement of Negroes in New England, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 543
(1925); and Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865, 32 J.
NEGRO HIST. 143 (1947).
142. See Lemons & McKenna, supra note 134, at 30.
143. On the conception of blacks as innately inferior, see GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK
IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914,
at 43-96 (1971); and JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE
NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 134-53 (1964).
144. NEw YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 191 (statement of Samuel Young).
145. NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835, supra note 138, at 80 (statement of Louis D. Wilson).
146. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1821, supra note 45, at 180 (statement of John Ross).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 191 (statement of Samuel Young).
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hands."'' 50 They composed "[o]ne half of the tenants of our jails and
penitentiaries," John Sterigere, a delegate to Pennsylvania's convention,
announced conclusively.'15  While white men were inherently independent
and resistant to every temptation to sacrifice their vote, a black man's vote
"would be at the call of the richest purchaser," warned Samuel Young.'52
There were others who bypassed the question of capacity altogether and
denied that blacks could ever vote because they were not citizens. With
arguments that would reappear nearly twenty years later in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,' 53 Pennsylvanians, for instance, asserted in their constitutional
convention that blacks were slaves and not citizens when the Declaration of
Independence asserted that all men were created equal.'5 Neither the state's
Gradual Abolition Act of 1780' 55 nor either of Pennsylvania's previous
constitutions"' granted blacks citizenship, these delegates argued. Therefore,
blacks had no grounds to exercise the vote.
Defenders of black suffrage countered on two grounds. Some who were
pessimistic about the possibility of enfranchising all blacks argued that
property gave some black men the qualifications to vote. In North Carolina,
for instance, defenders of black suffrage argued that it was "a strange anomaly
in a republick to deny to any free citizen the privilege of voting, and at the
same time acknowledge that he is free, and tax him as such.""' It was not
"right and just in us as men and as republicans," one author argued, "to
disenfranchise a whole class of freemen, who contribute to an equal proportion
to the support of the Government."'5 5 This author invoked the principle of
"taxation and representation, or the right not to be deprived of your property
save of your own consent": This principle, the author argued, was "sacred and
just in itself," even for blacks, and the violation of this principle would have
tarnished the American system."' Only prejudice, another author argued, led
to the objection "that free blacks are too corrupt and ignorant to exercise the
150. Id.
151. 9 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVE.NTION O- THEF CO.tMON,% EALTH (*E P-NNSYLVANIA
To PROPOSE AmENDMENT'S TO THE CONSTITUTION. COMMI'C-I) ANt) HFLI) AT IIARRISBLRG 364.
(Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Park 1838) [hereinalter PF-NNSYLVANIA CoNxI-%',rtmN o- I137-183,1
(statement of John Sterigere).
152. NEv YORK CONVENTION OF 1821. supra note 45. at 191 (statenient oI Samuel Young, On
popular white opinion in North Carolina against continued black enlranchtsemreni. seC ('HARLOrE- J . Jul)
3. 1835, at 3; on opinion in Pennsylvania, see GARY B NASH. FORLNG FRF-F-XtI THE- |-ORIdATION OF-
PHILADELPHIA'S BLACK CoMMuNrry, 1720-1840. at 223-27 (198h)
153. 60 U.S. (19 How) 393, 406-27 (1857)
154. See 9 PENNSYLVANIA CoN\ENTIoN o- 1837-183N. supra note 151. at 323-30 'statement of E M
Sturdevant); see also id. at 356-67 (statement of John Sterigere
155. 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYL\ANIA I-ROM 1682 To IOl. at 67.73 0J.aIes T
Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds, 1904)
156. See PA. CONST. of 1790; PA CONST of 1776
157. Convention, NEWBERN SPECTATOR & POL RkG (North Carolina,. June 19. 1835. at 3
158. Madison, N.C. J, (Fayetteville). June 24, 1835. at 3
159. Id.; see alao FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER. June 16. 1835. at 3 ("There is, so lar as %%e cin leirn.
a general feeling of regret in this community at the total disenlranchisement o the ree ..oloucd people ")
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right [to vote] for the common weal."'16 The ownership of property
demonstrated that there were "many of them who make the very best citizens
and mechanics, and whose intelligence is far above the standard of
mediocrity."'' Therefore, "those who possess such a freehold, which is
seldom or never obtained except by the worthy, ought, for the sake of justice
and good policy,... be distinguished from the others."' 162 This argument
worked only in New York, where blacks retained the vote in the constitutions
of 1822 and 1846, so long as they owned a substantial amount of property. 6 3
Elsewhere, the attempt to use property ownership to rebut the presumption of
black incapacity failed. "
Recognizing that property arguments were no longer convincing, black
suffrage advocates often used capacity-based arguments instead. Blacks
meeting in their own state conventions'65 and their white advocates in state
constitutional conventions argued that "[t]he mere possession of property
was ... no test of political merit."'66 Consequently, "if political privileges
were extended to [a black man's] race, they should not depend on his
possessions, but on his manhood.' 67 Benjamin F. Bruce of New York
argued that "the truth [is] self evident that 'all men are created equal,"' and
sought to "reduce to practice what we all hold most tenaciously in
theory."' 161 If it were true, he said, that "'colored persons' are men then give
them the rights and privileges of men."'169 But "if they are not men, then
make them slaves, chattles and things, and let us have no more of this
'opposition to slavery' and desire 'to benefit the colored man' that is so much
talked in favor of and voted against."'170 Or as Thomas Foster of Minnesota
argued in 1857, "Complexion has nothing to do with a man's mental capacity;
nothing to do with his political efficiency; and nothing to do with his ability
to serve the State, either in the councils of the nation, or upon her battle
fields."'
7'
160. Smith, N.C. J. (Fayetteville), July I, 1835, at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See FIELD, supra note 136, at 29, 53.
164. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1835, supra note 138, at 69-70 (statement of
Nathaniel Macon); id. at 71 (statement of Richard D. Spaight).
165. See, e.g., MEMORIAL. To THE HONORABLE THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MET 6 (n.p. 1855) (noting that the black
population "compares favorably with the white population in intelligence, and morality"). See generally
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds.,
1979) (printing the proceedings of the antebellum black state conventions).
166. NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 123, at 1027 (statement of John A. Kennedy).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1016 (statement of Benjamin F. Bruce).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE TERRITORY OF
MINNESOTA, TO FORM A STATE CONSTITUTION PREPARATORY TO ITS ADMISSION INTO THE UNION AS A
STATE 341 (St. Paul, George W. Moore 1858) (statement of Thomas Foster).
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This argument over the nature of black intelligence continued in the
congressional debate on the Fifteenth Amendment. The proponents of the
Amendment asserted that "[i]ntellect, and not wealth" should be the sole
criterion for the suffrage.17 ' As Senator Adonijah S. Welch of Florida
pointed out:
[I]ntelligence and virtue are not the distinctive characteristics of races;
they are not peculiar to any race; they are not monopolized by nor
wholly excluded from any people on the round earth. Intelligence and
virtue are individual possessions, inconstant qualities varying ad
infinitum among the individuals of every people .... Those constant
qualities which mark the different races are mainly physical,
consisting of peculiarities of color, feature, figure, and the like; but as
these peculiarities are not the qualifications for the voter, nor indicate
the presence or absence of such qualifications, they cannot without
absurdity be assumed as the ground for withholding or bestowing the
right of suffrage.'
73
Opponents of black suffrage replied using similar terms. Senator George
Vickers of Maryland claimed that "[t]he negro as a class, as a race, is
unfortunately ignorant and superstitious .... He needs the very qualities and
qualifications essential to a free, fair, and sensible exercise of the elective
franchise." 174 The Fifteenth Amendment gave blacks the vote on paper, but
this achievement hardly demonstrated a metamorphosis in people's beliefs.' 7 5
Deprived of the weapons of racial classifications, southern Democrats quickly
and successfully resorted to other techniques, such as literacy tests and poll
taxes, to impede black access to the polls.'
7 6
172. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 690 (1869) (statement of Rep Beck)
173. Id. at 982 (statement of Sen. Welch).
174. Id. at 911 (statement of Sen. Vickers).
175. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. 1863-1877. at 447
(1988) ("[It was not a limited commitment to blacks' rights. but the desire to retain other inequahties.
affecting whites, that produced a Fifteenth Amendment. "); FREDRICKSON. supra note 143. at 183
("What made Negro suffrage in the South acceptable to the North by 1867 was not a profound belief in
the black man's capacity for intelligent citizenship but the political necessities of restructunng the Union
under Northern or Republican hegemony."); WILLIAM GILLE-IE, THE RIGHT To VOTE POLITICS AND THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1965) (arguing that Republicans favored the Fifteenth
Amendment for partisan purposes); EARL M. MALTL, CIVIL RIGHTS. THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 156 (1990) (noting that the drafters of the Amendment "understood that the only new
requirement they were adding was that any qualification for voting has to be applied equally to all races
[and that s]uch a requirement might have little practical impact"); Xi Wang. Black Suffrage and tie
Redefinition of American Freedon, 1860-1870. 17 CARDOZO L. REV 2153. 2222-23 (1996) (arguing that
the Fifteenth Amendment was a compromise measure). But see MCPHERSON. supra note 143. at 417-32
(portraying the Fifteenth Amendment as the culmination of the abolitionist struggle). LaWanda Cox & John
H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Polincs: The Problem of Motanon tit Recontrucnon
Historiography, 33 J.S. HIST. 303, 330 (1967) (arguing that Republicans were motivated by pnnciple)
176. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER. THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH. 1880-1910 (1974) (detailing the
concerted effort to disenfranchise blacks in the South at the turn of the century); X1 WANG. THE TRIAL O
DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLICANS. 1860-1910 (1997) (detailing the failure
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III. CONCLUSION: INSIDE OUT
Although today we equate political rights, like suffrage, with
citizenship,177  thereby disenfranchising aliens, 78  the nineteenth century
stressed the inner character and capacity of persons. This is not to say that
property qualifications, like the poll tax, disappeared entirely; they did not.
79
The focus of the suffrage debate, however, had shifted radically. William
Greene of Massachusetts put the nineteenth-century perspective well: "No
living creature can be recognized as one of the people, if that living creature
has not rational faculties by which it can either consent or refuse to become
the subject of government."'"0 If "[o]xen and horses cannot give their
consent to government," Greene continued, "neither can madmen, idiots, or
immature children give their consent; and therefore, it follows, on account of
this natural incapacity, that none of these can be recognized as people."''
The look within often ended in an evaluation of the qualities of the mind, as
in James R. Leib's (by then) uncontroversial assertion in an 1839 pamphlet
"that the intellect of society does not reside, exclusively, with the monied
men,"'182  or in Samuel Jones's contention that only those who had
of federal enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment).
177. This is a far cry from the 19th-century distinction of political rights, like suffrage, and civil rights,
like citizenship, as exemplified by Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 176 (1874), which upheld
Missouri's restriction of the vote to males and denied the identity of citizenship rights and voting rights.
Still, the equation today is not perfect, as the disenfranchisement of felons and insane persons in many
states attests. See infra notes 190, 194. On the importance of voting to citizenship, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 25-62 (1991).
178. The 19th century, on the whole, felt comfortable enfranchising aliens. See GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996). In
1926, Arkansas became the last state to disenfranchise aliens. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien
Suffrage, 25 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). A number of recent articles have advocated the
enfranchisement of aliens. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German
andAmerican Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, LegalAliens, Local Citizens:
The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391
(1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092 (1977).
179. A version of the Fifteenth Amendment proposed by Senator Henry Wilson failed. This version
would have abolished qualifications for voting and office holding based on "race, color, nativity, property,
education, or religious belief." See GILLETrE, supra note 175, at 59 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1029 (1869)). The poll tax qualification for federal elections was outlawed by the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment in 1964 and declared unconstitutional for state elections in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See generally DUDLEY 0. McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY
110-80 (1949) (advocating the abolition of the poll tax).
It is important to note as well that the decline in the significance of property in the context of voting
rights in the 19th century did not lead to a representational system of "one person, one vote." Property (as
well as other interests) maintained its disproportionate influence in the apportionment of representative
districts until Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which held that legislators represent people and not
areas and that legislative districts must be apportioned, as nearly as practicable, on the basis of equal
population.
180. 2 MASSACHUSETrS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 92, at 726 (statement of William Greene).
181. Id.
182. JAMES R. LEIB, THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 14 (Philadelphia, John C. Clark 1839).
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"intelligence and honesty" deserved the vote.'' Whereas the eighteenth
century looked to property for guidance in determining a person's fitness to
vote, the nineteenth century turned to the soundness of a person's mind.
But where did this logic end? If intelligence was truly the best test of
capacity, should there not be an educational requirement? So thought Samuel
Jones.' 84 And although few others agreed, anxiety about a poorly educated
electorate fueled the movement for public education.'"5 Perhaps, instead, one
should look to a person's age? So thought James Leib, who suggested raising
the voting age to thirty-three, which he called the "age of reflection.""Iss Or
better yet a literacy requirement? So thought legislators in Connecticut and
Massachusetts, who, eager to disenfranchise a growing immigrant population
in the 1850s, adopted such provisions." 7 By the early twentieth century,
seven southern states and nine western states had followed suit.Iss Perhaps
paupers should be disenfranchised since failure to work might indicate a lack
of capacity? So thought the fourteen states that had enacted such provisions by
the end of the nineteenth century." 9 Certainly, then, a felony conviction
indicated a lack of the requisite sensibilities. So thought the nineteen states that
disenfranchised felons by the Civil War.' Or what about the insane, who,
183. SAMUEL JONES, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OI- SUI-RAGE 84 (Boston. Otis. Brorders & Co
1842).
184. See id. at 128-34.
185. See DAVID W. ROBSON, EDUCATING REPUBLICANS 251-52 (1985)
186. LEIB, supra note 182, at 17. See generally WENDELL W CULTICE Yotri'S BATrL -OR THE
BALLOT (1992) (providing a history of voting age requirements)
187. See CONN. CONST. of 1818. amend. X1 (1855). M.,SS CONST amend XX (1857). TYLER
ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS Oi- THE 1850s.
at 138, 248-52 (1992).
188. See KOUSSER, supra note 176, at 55 Ibl 2 I. McGoVNEY. supra note 179. at 59-60. Arthur W
Bromage, Literacy and the Electorate, 24 AM POL Sci REV 946 (1930) Literacy tests were upheld, under
minimum scrutiny, in Lassiter : Northampton County Board of Elections. 360 U S 45. 51 (1959). because.
as the Court noted. "[t]he ability to read and write . has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot." Congress, however. prohibited such tests in the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285. 84 Stat. 314. 315 (codified as amended at 42 USC §
1973b(b)-(c) (1994)). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U S 112. 118 (1970) (upholding the literacy test
provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970)
189. See Steinfeld, supra note 2, at 335 Steinleld concludes that in the early I9th century the
"republican precept that only the self-governing should exercise political authority was recast [withl
the liberal idea that the self-governing were those who owned and dtsposed of themselves " Id at 375
Steinfeld's article now serves as the conventional wisdom See, e g . James A Hencrtta. The Ri5e and
Decline of "Democratic Republicanism ": Political Rights in New Kork and the Se% eral States, 1800.1915.
53 ALB. L. REV. 357, 369 (1989) (citing Steinfeld). Steinfeld's labor theory ol suffrage is pan of the story.
but not the full story. The theory's most obvious shortcoming is its failure to clanty other resmictions. such
as those based on race and sex.
190. See PORTER, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.lll Fourteen states currently disenfranchisc felons for life
See Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalisn: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambit alences
of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217 n 125 (1997) (lsting the pertinent constitutional and
statutory provisions). There have been a number of discussions of disenfranchtsement of felons since
Richardson v. Ramirez. 418 U.S. 24. 41-56 (1974). which upheld disenfranchisement of fllons under
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See. e.g., Note. The Disenfranchisement of Ex.-Felons Citizenship.
Criminality and "Tie Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV L REV 1300 (19891 (arguing that felon
disenfranchisement is illegitimate since its purpose is to define the boundaries of the community by placing
some outside those boundaries); Furman, 3upra (arguing for the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws
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by definition, lacked the requisite mental capacity? So thought a number of
states: Massachusetts disenfranchised those under guardianship in 1821,'
Virginia disenfranchised persons of "unsound mind" in 1830,'92 and within
the next thirty years, eleven other states followed suit.'93 After the Civil War
and into the twentieth century, insanity provisions became commonplace in
new and amended constitutions.'94 Americans pursued the logic of the look
on the basis of their illiberalism); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment,
25 STAN. L. REv. 845, 858-60 (1973) (criticizing felon disenfranchisement on Eighth Amendment grounds);
Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act);
see also Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State
Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543 (1988) (finding state statutes barring
felons from holding elective office unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
191. See MASS. CONST. amend. III (1821).
192. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14.
193. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 11,
§ 5 (1857); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1859) (amended 1974); MD.
CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1857) (amended 1974); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art.
II, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 6 (1851); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1857) (amended 1944); R.I. CONST. art.
II, § 4 (1842) (amended 1950); WIs. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986). Virginia retained the
clause in its 1851 constitution. See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1. Nineteenth-century constitution-
makers did not differentiate between varieties of mental illness. They used a number of words
interchangeably, such as "lunatic," TEX. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); "insane," WIs.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (1848) (amended 1986); "idiot," WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996); and
"non compos mentis," id. This lack of precision has persisted in modern constitutions. See BRUCE DENNIS
SALES Er AL., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW 100 (1982) (noting the variation in terminology).
194. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901) (amended 1996); ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII,
§ 3, cl. 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1874); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 3, cl. 6; DEL. CONST. art.
V, § 2 (1897); FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 4; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1877,
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 6, cl. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1889) (amended 1950);
KY. CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (1891) (amended 1955); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 187; MD. CONST. art. 1, § 2
(1867) (amended 1972); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890) (amended
1935); MISS. CONST. of 1869, art. VII, § 2; Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 8; MONT. CONST. of 1889,
art. IX, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1875); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1864) (amended 1880); N.J.
CONST. art. II, 6 (1947) (amended 1995); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § I (1911) (amended 1967); N.D. CONST.
art. V, § 127 (1889) (amended 1978); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1907) (amended 1918); S.C. CONST. art.
II, § 6, cl. 2 (1895) (amended 1971); S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1889) (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art.
VI, § 1, cl. 2 (1876) (amended 1932); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. VI; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1895)
(amended 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § I (1872) (amended 1994); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. 11, §
1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1889) (amended 1996).
Until recently, nearly every state prohibited "mental incompetents" from voting, either by constitution
or by statute. See RICHARD C. ALLEN ET AL., MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67
(1968) (reviewing the case law); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 333-40 (Samuel J. Brakel &
Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions in chart form); SALES
ET AL., supra note 193, at 101-04 (same); Joseph F. Vargyas, Voting Rights and Jury Duty, in 3 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1771, 1771-81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Criminal Law &
Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. 116, 1979) (reviewing the case law); Robert W. Stockstill,
Comment, Voting and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (1986);
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Voting Rights of Persons Mentally Incapacitated, 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1116-33
(1977) (same). For recent developments, see BARBARA A. WEINER, Rights ofhitstitutionalized Persons, in
SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251 (3d ed. 1985). Weiner writes:
"While disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was common in the past, today statutes in a number
of states secure the vote to such individuals." Id. at 259.
While occasional dicta in the 1970s suggested that disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled was
constitutional, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (comparing felons with
"insane persons [who] have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly"); Kronlund v. Honstein,
327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of her electoral
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within as far as it would take them, to root out every "'biological breach of the
social compact."1"5
These categorical exclusions, however, were the exceptional cases-the
evaluation of the average person's inner self was a more difficult proposition.
Several popular nineteenth-century movements claimed to offer pseudo-
scientific certainty in analyzing a person's mental and moral capacities. The
search for such easy answers offers a partial explanation for the appeal of
phrenology, which claimed that the shape of a person's head revealed their
intellectual and moral character.196 A host of more mainstream scientists,
such as Louis Agassiz and Samuel George Morton, went on to "prove" in their
process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior %%hose behas tot can
be said to be destructive of society's aims," and declaring that "a State ma) prohibit idiots and insane
persons .. from participating in her elections"). it is unclear hoss the Supreme Court would rule today
on an equal protection challenge to insanity clauses given its decision in (as, of Cleburne t Cleburne
Living Center. 473 U S. 432 (1985) Cleburne held that mental retardation is not a quasi-stspcUct
classification, see id. at 442, but rejected a ban on group homes under a rational basis standard, 3ee ul at
450. Both before and after Cleburne, commentators ar'ued that mental illness should be treated as a suspect
classification under equal protection doctrine and that, consequently, mental disablht, restrictions on
suffrage should be declared unconstitutional See. e g . RoBI-RT M Li-VY & Li-ONARD S RUBI-NSTELN. Till
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 293 & nn 50-51 (1996) taiguing that institutionalied
persons have a constitutional right to vote). Steven K Metcall. Comment. 77e Right To Vote of the
Mentally Disabled tn Oklahoma: A Case Stud, of Overrnchtst e Language and Fundamental Rights. 25
TULSA L.J. 171 (1989) (urging that stnct scrutiny be applied to render unconstitutional statutes that prohibit
the mentally ill from voting); Note, Mental Disabilit and the Right To Vbte. 88 YALI- L J 1644 (1979)
(same); Note, Mental Illness: A Stapect Classificaton". 83 YALI L J 1237. 1267 (1974) (arguing that
mental disability restrictions violate equal protection)
195. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presunptrioi of Jus [ice -Las. Politics. arid the Mentalli Retarded Parent.
103 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1204 (1990); see also MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THl'- DIFFiRENC-
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 121-28 (1990) (delineating the legal history of competence
and incompetence).
196. Phrenologists, like Elisha P Hurlbut, did not miss the connections betsseen phrenology's
biological discoveries and political relorm In his Es~a\Ns on Ihonan Rights and Their Politic al Guaranties.
Hurlbut argued that all who had the proper "'intelligence and moral impulse*" deser-,ed the ote E P
HURLBUT, ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIS lIV) (New York, Greeley &
McElrath 1845) By the same token, all those "whose moral and intellectual laculties ate immature'
(children), "whose intellectual perceptions are so disordered as to depart Irom the standard o truth and
reason" (the insane), "whose moral natures are so delecti'e as that their impulses are chielly in lavor ol
the licentious indulgence of their animal desires" (lelons). and those "grossly ignorant and unenhightened"
(the illiterate) should "be excluded from a participation in Government - /i at IlI -12 (emphasis omitted)
Using these rules, Hurlbut argued that women should be alloeLd to vote since their natures dillered enough
from men that they could not adequately be represented See itd at 112-23 It ts no %,onder. then. that
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, in their hlotor% of Wonan Suffrage. listed phrenology
together with the Protestant Reformation, Quakensm, and transcendentalism as among the major revelations
of science, religion, and philosophy that led to the woman's rights movement ol the 19th century See I
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 51 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al eds. Nes% York, Fowler & Wells 1881.
Hurlbut did not address the question of black suffrage On Hurlbut, see JoiN D DAvt-S. PIRENOLOGY,
FAD AND SCIENCE 167 (1955); L. RAY GUNN. THE DECLINh o0 AUTHORITY PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY
.AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK. 1800-1800, at 175-76 (19881. and I LkGAL AND JUDICIAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 403 (Alden Chester ed, 1911) On phrenolog). see Ro;-R CooTf-R. TH-
CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE PHRENOLOGY AND THE ORGANr/ATION O CONSE-%'T IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1984); DAVIES, aupra, DAVID D)' GIUsTINO, CONQUEST O- MIND
PHRENOLOGY AND VICTORIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1975). RoB-RT M YOUNG. MIND, BRAIN ANt)
ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-53 (1970). and Pierre Schlag. Las arid Phrenologv, 110
HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
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studies of the human brain the intellectual inferiority of blacks and other
races.197 On the basis of such pseudo-scientific claims, women and blacks
continued to be disenfranchised.' 98 So it was that the look within possessed
a sad irony: Americans, for all their searching inward, could not, in the end,
help but look outward.
197. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 62-104 (rev. ed. 1996); WILLIAM
STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATtiTUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-59 (1960).
198. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 246 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("Camper,
Soemmering, Lawrence, Virey, Ebel, and Blumenbach agree that the brain of the negro is smaller; and Gall,
Spurzheim, and Combe, that it is so distributed as to denote less capacity for reasoning and judging than
the Caucasian."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2248 (1864) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I exclude
a black man [from the suffrage] because black is the evidence that he is an inferior man .... "); William
A. Hammond, Womi in Politics, 137 N. AM. REV. 137, 141-42 (1883) ("The brain of woman is ..
different from that of man, and difference of structure necessarily involves difference of function."). It is
important also to note that many of the capacity qualifications blended together. For instance, blacks were
considered more likely to be insane than whites. See NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 104-08 (1964).
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